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(93) 
KEEPING FLSA’S PROMISES: THE THIRD CIRCUIT EXTENDS THE 
LAW’S REACH TO MORE JOINT EMPLOYERS, SUCCESSORS, AND 
SUPERVISORS IN THOMPSON v. REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE NETWORK 
JOHN M. D’ELIA* 
“Sometimes I’d work 60, even 90 days in a row . . . . They never paid 
overtime.”1 
- Guadalupe Rangel 
Mira Loma, California 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Guadalupe Rangel spent most of his waking hours unloading products for 
the largest private employer in the world—Walmart.2  Mr. Rangel worked up to 
eleven hours per day and often seven days per week for months on end.3  The 
family that owns Walmart boasts a cumulative wealth greater than that of 42% 
of American households combined.4  Mr. Rangel, on the other hand, alleged he 
never received overtime pay after putting in seventy-hour work weeks 
unloading Walmart products.5  At the warehouse where Mr. Rangel worked, 
Walmart dictated the work done, determined workers’ schedules, set accuracy 
and productivity standards, oversaw training programs, supervised workers, 
maintained staffing reports, and created budgets for labor costs.6  However, on 
paper, Walmart was not Mr. Rangel’s employer.7  A company called Schneider 
 
*   J.D. Candidate, 2016, Villanova University School of Law; B.A. 2011, George 
Washington University.  This Casebrief is dedicated to Anthony J. D’Elia and his unyielding 
hope in the labor and civil rights movements.  Additionally, this Casebrief would not have 
been possible without the love and support of my parents, John and Patricia D’Elia. 
1.  Steven Greenhouse, More Workers Are Claiming ‘Wage Theft’, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
31, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/01/business/more-workers-are-claiming-wage-
theft.html [https://perma.cc/52HK-LQL5?type=source] (quoting Mr. Rangel’s account of 
alleged overtime violations at Schneider Logistics warehouse where workers unloaded 
products to be sold at Walmart stores). 
2.  See id. (describing Mr. Rangel’s account of his work schedule and responsibilities). 
3.  See id. 
4.  See Josh Bivens, Another Measure of the Staggering Wage Gaps in the United 
States: Comparing Walton Family Wealth to Typical Households by Race and Ethnicity, 
ECON. POL’Y INST. (Oct. 13, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.epi.org/blog/measure-staggering-
wage-gaps-united-states/ [http://perma.cc/3HE4-FWFH] (discussing wealth concentration in 
U.S. economy by relying on data from Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances and 
Forbes 400 and comparing Walton family wealth to combined wealth of U.S. households by 
race and ethnicity). 
5.  See Greenhouse, supra note 1 (noting Mr. Rangel’s allegations of “wage theft” 
brought on by working up to eleven hours per day and sometimes seventy hours per week). 
6.  See Memorandum of Points & Auths. in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to 
File Third Am. Comp. at 9–10, Carrillo v. Schneider Logistics, Inc., No. CV 11–8557 CAS 
(DTBx) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012) (arguing Walmart is joint employer of warehouse workers 
at Schneider Logistics and thus is jointly and severally liable for wage and hour violations). 
7.  See id. (describing direct employment of workers by Schneider Logistics while 
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Logistics, Inc. directly employed Mr. Rangel, and its warehouse’s only client 
was Walmart.8 
Generally, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) entitles employees to 
receive “time and a half” pay (one and one-half the regular rate of pay) for any 
hours they work in excess of forty per week, and employees can sue employers 
who fail to compensate them for their overtime work.9  In the Ninth Circuit, 
where Mr. Rangel’s case unfolded, courts apply a test outlined in Bonnette v. 
California Health & Welfare Agency10 to determine whether a company is a 
“joint employer” of workers by virtue of its control over employment matters.11  
This “Bonnette” test empowers aggrieved workers to sue companies other than 
their immediate employer for wage and hour violations when such companies 
have significant influence, even indirect influence, over workers.12  Imposing 
such liability empowers workers to vindicate their workplace rights in reality; 
often companies without a formal employment relationship with employees 
exert tremendous power over working conditions and precipitate FLSA 
violations.13  When Mr. Rangel and other plaintiffs sued Schneider and 
Walmart, the companies settled with the plaintiffs for $21 million dollars, which 
covered 1,800 Schneider warehouse workers.14 
 
Walmart exerts considerable authority over workers’ terms and conditions of employment). 
8.  See id. at 9–10. 
9.  See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2012) (requiring employers to compensate employees at 
one and one-half rate of pay for any hours worked in excess of forty per week). 
10.  704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983). 
11.  See id. at 1470 (articulating Ninth Circuit’s test for determining whether company 
is joint employer of workers liable for FLSA violations, emphasizing hiring and firing 
authority, supervisory authority, authority to control schedules and employment, power to set 
rate and method of payment, and maintenance of employment records), disapproved by Garcia 
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
12.  See id. at 1469–70 (stressing breadth of FLSA’s definition of “employer”—which 
includes individuals acting indirectly in interest of employers—and quoting regulations by 
Department of Labor, which enforces FLSA, that provide hypothetical examples of indirect 
employment relationships that meet FLSA’s liberal definition, including company that 
controls another company that immediately employs workers). 
13.  See, e.g., Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 145 (2d Cir. 
2008) (finding hospital was joint employer of nurse despite that nurse was directly employed 
and paid by third party agencies because “(1) [the nurse] worked on [the hospital’s] premises 
using [its] equipment; (2) no referral agency shifted its employees as a unit from one hospital 
to another, but instead each assigned health care workers, including [the nurse], to the same 
facility whenever possible to ensure continuity of care; (3) [the nurse] performed work 
integral to [the hospital’s] operation; (4) [the nurse’s] work responsibilities at [the hospital] 
remained the same regardless of which agency referred her for a particular assignment; (5) 
[the hospital] effectively controlled the on-site terms and conditions of [the nurse’s] 
employment; and (6) [the nurse] worked exclusively for [the hospital]”), abrogation 
recognized by Adorno v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F. Supp. 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  
The hospital in Barfield had the power to hire and fire nurses referred by agencies, although 
“ultimate” authority rested with the agencies.  See id. at 144.  Similarly, the court observed 
that the hospital exercised some influence over pay, because it effectively determined 
employees’ hours and capped their pay when it set the hourly rates referral agencies would 
receive.  See id. at 144–45. 
14.  See Ricardo Lopez, Workers Reach $21-Million Settlement Against Wal-Mart, 
Warehouses, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wal-mart-
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In In re Enterprise Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Employment Practices 
Litigation15 (Enterprise), the Third Circuit adopted aspects of the Bonnette test 
to ensure plaintiffs like Mr. Rangel may hold indirect employers accountable 
for wage theft.16  As a result, companies exercising both direct and indirect 
control over workers may be deemed joint employers liable to workers for 
violations of the FLSA.17 
In 2014, the Third Circuit reaffirmed its Enterprise test in Thompson v. 
Real Estate Mortgage Network.18  Additionally, the Thompson court adopted 
new FLSA tests with respect to successor and supervisor liability, which will 
similarly expand the universe of entities responsible for FLSA violations.19  
Thompson extended the FLSA’s reach in the Third Circuit to cover more 
employers, a positive development that comports with the text and underlying 
policies of the FLSA.20  Thompson also has important implications in light of 
the unprecedented growth in subcontracting and other multi-layered 
 
warehouse-workers-20140515-story.html [http://perma.cc/ENM6-FCNZ] (describing 
settlement between defendants Walmart and Schneider Logistics and plaintiff-warehouse 
workers); see also Carrillo v. Schneider Logistics, Inc., No. CV 11-8557 CAS (DTBx), 2013 
WL 140214, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2013) (granting plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend 
complaint to include Walmart as defendant).  Walmart argued that it should not be deemed a 
joint employer under the Bonnette test, but the judge found this argument “more properly 
addressed on a motion to dismiss.”  See id. at *5. 
15.  683 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2012).  
16.  See generally id. at 469–70 (articulating test for joint employment and 
acknowledging that its test is “melding” of Bonnette test from Ninth Circuit and test 
developed by Western District of Pennsylvania in Lewis v. Vollmer, No. 05–1632, 2008 WL 
355607 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2008), which found joint employment only under more limited 
circumstances involving only direct control over employment matters in context of Title VII 
and Age Discrimination in Employment Act claims).  
17.  See id. at 469 (articulating a standard to determine whether a company is joint 
employer under FLSA, considering “1) the alleged employer’s authority to hire and fire the 
relevant employees; 2) the alleged employer’s authority to promulgate work rules and 
assignments and to set the employees’ conditions of employment: compensation, benefits, and 
work schedules, including the rate and method of payment; 3) the alleged employer’s 
involvement in day-to-day employee supervision, including employee discipline; and 4) the 
alleged employer’s actual control of employee records, such as payroll, insurance, or taxes”).  
The Enterprise court stressed that this list is not exhaustive and other indicia of significant 
control may also be considered.  See id. 
18.  748 F.3d 142, 148–49 (3d Cir. 2014) (applying Enterprise test to mortgage 
underwriter’s claim that two real estate companies were joint employers and thus jointly and 
severally liable for FLSA violations she suffered). 
19.  See id. at 152–54 (adopting broad federal common law standard for successor 
liability in context of FLSA claims and extending prior test for supervisor liability under 
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) to FLSA claims).  For a further discussion on both of 
these standards, see infra notes 108–30 and accompanying text. 
20.  Compare, e.g., Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 815 (1981) 
(delineating traditional, narrow New Jersey state law standard for successor liability), with 
Thompson, 748 F.3d at 150–52 (delineating and adopting federal common law standard for 
successor liability in context of FLSA claims, which extends liability to more successors than 
state law standard to further important “employment-related policies”).  See also 29 U.S.C. § 
202 (2012) (declaring far-reaching United States industrial policy to eliminate burdens and 
obstructions to commerce posed by substandard terms and conditions of employment); id. § 
203(d) (defining “employer” to include employers exerting indirect control over employees).  
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employment relationships because it will subject more of these relationships to 
FLSA’s protections.21 
Part II of this Casebrief provides background information on the 
substantive provisions and policy purposes of the FLSA.22  Additionally, Part II 
traces the development of case law in the Third Circuit regarding the FLSA’s 
application to corporations and individuals outside the immediate employment 
relationship.23  Part III explores the facts, procedural history, and holding of 
Thompson.24  Part IV concludes that Thompson appropriately extended the 
FLSA’s reach to subject more employers to liability for wage theft consistent 
with the statutory text and underlying policies.25  Part V provides advice to 
practitioners representing employees and employers in the Third Circuit after 
Thompson.26  Part VI states a brief conclusion.27 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Congress enacted the FLSA in the wake of the Great Depression to 
improve labor standards by establishing minimum wage and overtime pay 
requirements.28  These policies were intended to spur macroeconomic change 
and ensure workers fair pay.29  Courts have interpreted the FLSA to apply to an 
evolving range of “employers” since its enactment, including joint employers, 
successors, and individual supervisors.30 
 
21.  See, e.g., CATHERINE RUCKELSHAUS ET AL., NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WHO’S 
THE BOSS: RESTORING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR LABOR STANDARDS IN OUTSOURCED WORK 
19 (2014), available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/Justice/2014/Whos-the-Boss-Restoring-
Accountability-Labor-Standards-Outsourced-Work-Report.pdf?nocdn=1 
[http://perma.cc/27KS-AXLD] (reporting staffing industry “doubl[ed] as a share of overall 
employment” during 1990s and in 2013, accounted for 3.4 million jobs or 2.5% of all U.S. 
employment); see also Michael Grabell, The Expendables: How the Temps Who Power 
Corporate Giants Are Getting Crushed, PROPUBLICA (June 27, 2013, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/the-expendables-how-the-temps-who-power-corporate-
giants-are-getting-crushe [http://perma.cc/A3FZ-BEK3] (reporting American Staffing 
Association estimation that staffing jobs account for up to 10% of all U.S. employment). 
22.  For a background discussion of the FLSA, see infra notes 31–42 and 
accompanying text. 
23.  For a discussion of Supreme Court and Third Circuit case law on the FLSA’s 
definition of employer, see infra notes 43–83 and accompanying text. 
24.  For a detailed explanation of the Third Circuit’s decision in Thompson, see infra 
notes 84–130 and accompanying text. 
25.  For a critical analysis of the Third Circuit’s holding in Thompson, see infra notes 
131–78 and accompanying text. 
26.  For practical advice for practitioners, see infra notes 182–206 and accompanying 
text. 
27.  For a conclusion of this Casebrief, see infra notes 207–10 and accompanying text. 
28.  For a discussion of the history of FLSA, see infra notes 31–42 and accompanying 
text. 
29.  For a discussion of FLSA’s industrial policy aims, see infra notes 36–42 and 
accompanying text. 
30.  For a discussion of judicial interpretation of FLSA to apply to various employer 
entities, see infra notes 43–83 and accompanying text. 
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A. FLSA: Groundbreaking Labor Protections and Far-Reaching 
Industrial Policy 
The FLSA is a landmark piece of New Deal legislation enacted by 
Congress in 1938.31  For the first time, the law established a federal minimum 
wage and mandated overtime compensation.32  The FLSA’s overtime 
provisions require employers to pay covered employees “time and a half” for 
hours worked in excess of forty hours per week.33  The FLSA provides a 
private cause of action to employees who suffer a statutory violation.34  
Employees can recover unpaid compensation in addition to an equivalent 
amount in liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs.35 
The FLSA not only reflected the New Deal Congress’s determination to 
protect workers from “sweatshop” conditions, but also represented 
groundbreaking industrial policy calculated to bring about macroeconomic 
changes.36  Congress saw the minimum wage as a means of eliminating unfair 
business competition rooted in substandard wages.37  In Congress’s view, that 
 
31.  See 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) (crediting FLSA as enacted on June 25, 1938). 
32.  See id. §§ 206–212 (establishing minimum wage, maximum hours, and abolishing 
child labor).  Currently, the minimum wage rate required by FLSA is $7.25 per hour.  See id. 
§ 206(a) (“Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any workweek is 
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an 
enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, wages . . . not 
less than . . . $7.25 an hour . . . .”). 
33.  See id. § 207(a)(1) (“[N]o employer shall employ any of his employees who in any 
workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is 
employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, 
for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his 
employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half 
times the regular rate at which he is employed.”). 
34.  See id. § 216 (“Any employer who violates the provisions of [the minimum wage 
or overtime provisions] shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of 
their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and 
in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.”). 
35.  See id. (providing courts shall “in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff 
or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the 
action”). 
36.  See Domestic Service Final Rule Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), U.S. DEP’T 
LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/homecare/faq.htm [http://perma.cc/YR7A-A9A4] (last 
visited Nov. 25, 2015) (describing Congress’s goals in enacting FLSA: “to provide minimum 
wage and overtime protections for workers, to prevent unfair competition among businesses 
based on subminimum wages, and to spread employment by requiring employers whose 
employees work excessive hours to compensate employees at one-and-one-half times the 
regular rate of pay for all hours worked over 40”). 
37.  See 81 CONG. REC. 4983 (1937) (statement of Pres. Roosevelt) (calling Congress to 
pass legislation “insuring to all our able-bodied working men and women a fair day’s pay for 
a fair day’s work”).  President Roosevelt’s message to Congress “served as the inspiration” 
for the enactment of the FLSA.  See Citicorp Indus. Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 483 U.S. 27, 36 n.8 
(1987) (emphasizing importance of presidential message); see also 29 U.S.C. § 202 (declaring 
it to be U.S. policy to eliminate “labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the 
minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of 
workers[,]” which “constitutes an unfair method of competition in commerce[,]” and has the 
effect of “burdening and obstructing commerce”). 
5
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sort of competition harmed more efficient firms that derived their profits from 
innovation and superior products or services by permitting inefficient firms to 
survive by eroding workers’ wages.38  Additionally, Congress sought to 
stimulate growth and support markets for the products of industry by driving up 
workers’ wages, and thus their purchasing power as consumers.39 
To complement the FLSA’s minimum wage policy, Congress enacted the 
overtime compensation requirement for two purposes.40  Congress sought both 
to protect workers from exploitative “overwork” and to reduce 
unemployment.41  By making “overwork” costly for employers, Congress 
hoped to spread work hours across more employees and thus increase the 
employment rate.42 
 
38.  See Amendment of the Fair Labor Standards Act: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of 
the S. Comm. on Educ. & Labor on S. 1349, 79th Cong. 847 (1945) (testimony of Chester 
Bowles, Adm’r, Office of Price Admin.) (describing Congress’s rationale for establishing 
minimum wage: “[T]he Congress decided that it is against the public interest for business to 
operate on the sweat of exploited workers.  Any employer so inefficient that he could stay in 
business only by paying sweatshop wages—like the employer who could stay in business only 
by operating an unsafe plant—was told that he did not belong in business.”); see also Marc 
Linder, The Minimum Wage as Industrial Policy: A Forgotten Role, 16 J. LEGIS. 151, 157 
(1990) (contending minimum wage promotes “macroeconomic productivity” by “interfering” 
with low-wage labor markets that “disguise inefficiency, creating large profit margins that are 
due not to efficient production but to extreme exploitation”).  Professor Linder further 
contends that this results in “forc[ing] out of business” inefficient, “low-productivity” firms 
that fail to become efficient or “modernize.”  See id.  According to Professor Linder, the 
minimum wage may also be conceptualized as a corrective for a “market failure.”  See id. at 
151 (internal quotations omitted).  Firms employing workers at substandard wage rates had at 
least partially shifted the “minimum social cost of maintaining a worker” onto workers 
themselves or the public at large.  See id.; see also 81 CONG. REC. 4983 (1937) (statement of 
Pres. Roosevelt) (“Enlightened business is learning that competition ought not to cause bad 
social consequences, which inevitably react upon the profits of business itself.”).  The FLSA 
forces firms to “internalize” these costs.  Linder, supra, at 151. 
39.  See 81 CONG. REC. 4983 (1937) (statement of Pres. Roosevelt) (urging Congress to 
“take further steps to reduce the lag in the purchasing power of industrial workers and to 
strengthen and stabilize the markets for the farmers’ products”); see also 82 CONG. REC. 11 
(1937) (statement of Pres. Roosevelt) (calling on Congress to pass legislation “to maintain 
wage income and the purchasing power of the Nation against recessive factors in the general 
industrial situation” including “[t]he exploitation of child labor and the undercutting of wages 
and the stretching of the hours of the poorest-paid workers in periods of business recession[,]” 
which “have a serious [detrimental] effect on buying power”). 
40.   See 81 CONG. REC. 4983–84 (1937) (statement of Pres. Roosevelt) (urging 
Congress to reduce excessive work hours in industry, which President Roosevelt hoped would 
spread employment). 
41.  See id. at 4984 (criticizing practice of “stretching workers’ hours” and “overwork” 
and stating “[r]easonable and flexible use of the long-established right of government to set 
and to change working hours can, I hope, decrease unemployment in those groups in which 
unemployment today principally exists”); see also 82 CONG. REC. 11 (1937) (statement of 
Pres. Roosevelt) (urging Congress to “protect workers unable to protect themselves from . . . 
excessively long hours”). 
42.  See Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 577–78 (1942) (“By this 
[overtime compensation] requirement, although overtime was not flatly prohibited, financial 
pressure was applied to spread employment to avoid the extra wage and workers were assured 
additional pay to compensate them for the burden of a workweek beyond the hours fixed in 
the act.  In a period of widespread unemployment and small profits, the economy inherent in 
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 6 [2014], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol60/iss6/8
2015] KEEPING FLSA’S PROMISES 99 
 
B. FLSA’s Evolving Reach: Third Circuit and Supreme Court Precedents 
Cast a Wide Net in Defining “Employer” 
In service of its broad policy agenda, the FLSA expansively defines 
employer as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an 
employer in relation to an employee . . . .”43  This definition of “striking 
breadth” looks to the “economic reality” of the employment relationship rather 
than “technical concepts.”44  Accordingly, the definition encompasses work 
relationships outside the traditional, formalistic conception of the employer-
employee relationship.45  Corporate officers, supervisors, and businesses that 
directly or indirectly control workers may also fall within the definition, 
sometimes simultaneously.46  For example, a company may hire a 
subcontractor to provide labor without hiring any of the subcontractor’s 
 
avoiding extra pay was expected to have an appreciable effect in the distribution of available 
work.  Reduction of hours was a part of the plan from the beginning.”), superseded by statute 
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251–262, as stated in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. 
Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985). 
43.  See 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2012). 
44.  See Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961) (basing 
holding on propositions that “‘economic reality’ rather than ‘technical concepts’ is to be the 
test of employment”); Enterprise, 683 F.3d 462, 467 (3d Cir. 2012) (characterizing Supreme 
Court precedent on FLSA as recognizing definition of employer of “striking breadth” (quoting 
Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1992)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
45.  See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150–51 (1947) (“[The FLSA] 
contains its own definitions, comprehensive enough to require its application to many persons 
and working relationships, which prior to [the FLSA], were not deemed to fall within an 
employer-employee category.”).  Similarly, the FLSA defines “employ” and “employee” 
expansively.  See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1), (e)(4)(A), (g) (providing “[t]he term ‘employee’ 
means any individual employed by an employer[,]” and “‘[e]mploy’ includes to suffer or 
permit to work”).  “Employ” in FLSA means only to “suffer or permit to work.”  See id.  A 
FLSA “employee” is “any individual employed by an employer.”  See id.  As the Supreme 
Court has observed, it would be difficult to imagine more inclusive definitions of “employ” 
and “employee.”  See United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362–63 (1945) (“A 
broader or more comprehensive coverage of employees within the stated categories would be 
difficult to frame.  The use of the words ‘each’ and ‘any’ to modify ‘employee,’ which in turn 
is defined to include ‘any’ employed individual, leaves no doubt as to the Congressional 
intention to include all employees within the scope of the [FLSA] unless specifically 
excluded.”).  Indeed, the Court acknowledged FLSA gave “employer” the “broadest definition 
that has ever been included in any one act.”  See id. at 363 n.3.  So long as a person works for 
another, he or she is an employee, regardless of whether or not the employer actively hired or 
instructed them; “suffer or permit to work” is all the FLSA requires.  See 29 U.S.C. § 203(g).  
All employees, no matter how they work or receive payment, are covered unless specifically 
excluded.  See Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. at 363.  
46.  See, e.g., Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1514 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding 
corporate officers to be employers personally liable for FLSA violations); Bonnette v. Cal. 
Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding local public agencies 
to be joint employers of homecare workers they provided to eligible recipients by virtue of 
agencies’ “considerable control over the structure and conditions of employment,” their 
determining tasks and “number of hours” of each chore worker, and their supervision of chore 
workers in event of dispute with the recipients), disapproved by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. 
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
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workers, signing their paychecks, or fixing their wages and benefits.47  
However, the client company may be deemed a joint employer if it sets work 
schedules, influences pay rates, or monitors workers’ productivity.48  In the 
case of Mr. Rangel presented in Part I, for instance, Walmart arguably did each 
of these.49  When determining employer status, courts must always remain 
cognizant of the long-established rule that FLSA is to be “liberally 
construed.”50  To serve its broad policy agenda, the FLSA also imposes liability 
upon successor firms for their predecessors’ violations in some 
circumstances.51 
1. Joint Employers: When Two Bosses Call the Shots 
Because the FLSA’s conception of employment reaches beyond 
immediate, formal employment relationships, it is possible for two or more 
entities to be deemed “joint employers” of workers.52  This is an important 
determination because, in addition to violations they commit themselves, joint 
employers are also jointly and severally liable for the FLSA violations of other 
joint employers.53 
In 2012, the Third Circuit articulated its standard for joint employment 
under FLSA in Enterprise.54  The Enterprise court blended the Ninth Circuit’s 
 
47.  See, e.g., Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 642–44 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding 
grower was joint employer of farm workers hired by staffing firm when grower set harvest 
schedules, inspected work performed, communicated satisfaction with work, and increased 
rates to subcontractor for explicit purpose of increasing workers’ pay during a “first picking,” 
but did not actually hire workers, pay them, or directly supervise them daily, with court 
stressing such indicia of direct control are not essential and that indirect control may suffice to 
establish joint employment).  
48.  See id. 
49.  See supra notes 2–27 and accompanying text. 
50.  See Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., 695 F.2d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 1983) (“[W]e 
adhere to the firmly-established guidon that the FLSA must be liberally construed to 
effectuate Congress’ remedial intent.”), abrogated on other grounds by Reich v. Bay, Inc., 23 
F.3d 110 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Mitchell v. C.W. Vollmer & Co., 349 U.S. 427, 429 (1955) 
(recognizing that long history of Supreme Court precedents have given FLSA “liberal 
construction” guided by “practical considerations, not by technical conceptions”).  
51.  See, e.g., Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, LLC, 711 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 
2013). 
52.  See Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(“Under the FLSA, multiple persons or entities can be responsible for a single employee’s 
wages as ‘joint employers’ in certain situations.  One such scenario occurs where both 
employers ‘exert significant control’ over the employee, ‘by reason of the fact that one 
employer controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the other employer.’” 
(citations omitted)).  
53.  See id. (explaining liability that arises after a court finds entity to be joint employer 
of workers within FLSA’s definition of employer). 
54.  See Enterprise, 683 F.3d 462, 468 (3d Cir. 2012).  In Enterprise, the court 
examined a case involving assistant managers for Enterprise Holdings’s subsidiaries.  See 
generally id.  The managers asserted Enterprise Holdings was a joint employer along with the 
subsidiaries.  See id. at 464–65.  The Enterprise court looked to the Third Circuit’s NLRB v. 
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Penn., Inc. (Browning-Ferris), 691 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1982), 
standard as its analysis’s “starting point.”  See id. at 468.  In 1982, the Third Circuit’s 
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Bonnette test with the more restrictive test from Lewis v. Vollmer55 adopted by 
the Western District of Pennsylvania.56  The Lewis test would have effectively 
required direct control of employment matters because its factors failed to leave 
room for indirect avenues of control as contemplated by the FLSA.57  
Consequently, the Third Circuit refused to adopt Lewis wholesale, finding it too 
narrow for the FLSA.58 
To better conform Lewis to the FLSA, the Third Circuit adopted aspects of 
the Bonnette test into its new standard.59  The result was a blended test, 
considering the alleged employer’s: 
 
landmark decision in Browning-Ferris established a test for joint employment under the 
NLRA.  See Browning-Ferris, 691 F.2d at 1122–23.  The Browning-Ferris standard still 
guides the National Labor Relations Board’s standard on joint employment relationships 
under the NLRA nationwide.  See Browning-Ferris Indus. of California, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 
186 (Aug. 27, 2015) (“Today, we restate the Board’s joint-employer standard to reaffirm the 
standard articulated by the Third Circuit in [the] Browning-Ferris decision. . . . In determining 
whether a putative joint employer meets this standard, the initial inquiry is whether there is a 
common-law employment relationship with the employees in question. If this common-law 
employment relationship exists, the inquiry then turns to whether the putative joint employer 
possesses sufficient control over employees’ essential terms and conditions of employment to 
permit meaningful collective bargaining.”).  According to the Third Circuit in Browning-
Ferris, two or more entities are joint employers when they “share or co-determine those 
matters governing essential terms and conditions of employment.”  Browning-Ferris, 691 
F.2d at 1119, 1123 (finding joint employment of drivers by waste processing facility (BFI) 
and truck brokers after consideration of following facts: drivers wore BFI logo on clothing; 
brokers and BFI insured trailers; BFI determined drivers’ start times; BFI approved drivers 
before hire; BFI directed drivers to perform certain tasks in certain spots; and BFI employee 
effectively terminated certain drivers).  The Third Circuit in Enterprise noted the Browning-
Ferris standard is consistent with the standard articulated by the Department of Labor (which 
enforces FLSA) regulations, which find joint employment “[w]here the employers are not 
completely disassociated with respect to the employment of a particular employee and may be 
deemed to share control of the employee, directly or indirectly, by reason of the fact that one 
employer controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with another employer.”  See 
Enterprise, 683 F.3d at 468 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
55.  No. 05-1632, 2008 WL 355607 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2008). 
56.  See Enterprise, 683 F.3d at 470 (“Therefore, we hold that the test for ‘joint 
employer’ under the FLSA is as we have fashioned it, a melding of the modified Lewis test 
and the Bonnette test, consistent with those considerations of the real world where such 
additional economic concerns are prominent.  We will refer to this test as the Enterprise 
test . . . .”).  The Lewis test from the Western District considers the following factors when 
determining joint employer status: “1) authority to hire and fire employees, promulgate work 
rules and assignments, and set conditions of employment, including compensation, benefits, 
and hours; 2) day-to-day supervision of employees, including employee discipline; and 3) 
control of employee records, including payroll, insurance, taxes and the like.”  Lewis, 2008 
WL 355607, at *4 (quoting Cella v. Villanova Univ., No. CIV.A 01–7181, 2003 WL 329147, 
at *9 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2003), aff’d 113 Fed. App’x 454 (3d Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
57.  See Enterprise, 683 F.3d at 469 (“A simple application of the Lewis test would only 
find joint employment where an employer had direct control over the employee, but the FLSA 
designates those entities with sufficient indirect control as well.  We therefore conclude that 
while the factors outlined today in Lewis are instructive they cannot, without amplification, 
serve as the test for determining joint employment under the FLSA.”). 
58.  See id. 
59.  See id. 
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1) authority to hire and fire the relevant employees; 2) authority to 
promulgate work rules and assignments and to set the employees’ 
conditions of employment: compensation, benefits, and work 
schedules, including the rate and method of payment; 3) involvement 
in day-to-day employee supervision, including employee discipline; 
and 4) actual control of employee records, such as payroll, insurance, 
or taxes.60 
The court stressed this list is not exhaustive and courts may consider other 
indicia of control.61 
The Enterprise test’s relative breadth is illustrated by its consideration of 
any “indicia of ‘significant control’” to show joint employment, and mere 
“involvement” in supervision and discipline as opposed to actual supervisory 
power.62  “Significance,” however, injects an important limitation: while 
indirect or direct control may suffice, such control must be significant.63  For 
example, a parent company’s nonbinding advice to subsidiaries about how to 
operate under its brand is something analogous to the suggestions of a “third 
party consultant” and insufficient to show joint employment in the Third 
Circuit.64  In the final analysis, a joint employment determination “must be 
based on a consideration of the total employment situation and the economic 
realities of the work relationship.”65 
2. Successors: FLSA Liability as a Hot Potato 
Generally, under most states’ laws, successor corporations are “legally 
distinct” from their predecessors.66  Successors only assume the debts or 
 
60.  Id. at 469. 
61.  See id. at 469–70 (stressing Enterprise test is not to be “blindly applied,” and that 
“other indicia of significant control” may suffice to establish joint employment “when 
incorporated with the individual factors we have set forth,” and in view of “economic realities 
of the work relationship” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
62.  See id. at 469 (articulating non-exhaustive factors considered in Third Circuit’s 
Enterprise test). 
63.  See id. at 468 (“We conclude that where two or more employers exert significant 
control over the same employees—[whether] from the evidence it can be shown that they 
share or co-determine those matters governing essential terms and conditions of 
employment—they constitute joint employers under the FLSA.” (alteration in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
64.  See id. at 471 (concluding Enterprise Holdings lacked sufficient authority to be 
deemed a joint employer of its subsidiaries’ workers and comparing parent company’s control 
to “third-party consultant”). 
65.  See id. at 469 (quoting Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 
1470 (9th Cir. 1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (finding Enterprise Holding not a 
joint employer).  The Ninth Circuit found that Enterprise Holdings exercised “no control, let 
alone significant control.”  See id. at 471.  
66.  Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 356 A.2d 458, 463 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976) 
(articulating general rule that successor corporations are completely distinct from predecessors 
and delineating factors which could justify exception rendering successors liable for debts of 
predecessors under New Jersey law).  In Wilson, a corporate defendant that bought a 
predecessor’s assets, assumed its contractual and property liabilities, and maintained its 
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liabilities of predecessor entities when (1) the purchasing corporation expressly 
or impliedly agreed to assume debts or liabilities, (2) the transaction is 
tantamount to a merger of the successor and predecessor, (3) the successor is a 
“mere continuation” of the predecessor, (4) the transaction is entered into 
fraudulently to escape liabilities, or (5) there was inadequate consideration for 
the sale or transfer.67 
In recent decades, however, federal courts have developed a broader 
standard for successor liability, specifically within the context of employment 
claims.68  The federal standard holds more successor entities liable for 
predecessor violations than state common law rules in order to further federal 
labor policies.69  Under the federal standard, courts may find successors liable 
considering merely “(1) continuity in operations and work force of the 
successor and predecessor employers; (2) notice to the successor-employer of 
its predecessor’s legal obligation; and (3) ability of the predecessor to provide 
adequate relief directly.”70 
The Supreme Court first applied the federal standard to claims under the 
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) and the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA).71  The NRLA seeks to promote labor peace by guaranteeing 
workers full freedom of association and the right to organize into unions and by 
imposing upon employers a duty to bargain collectively with those unions.72  In 
 
personnel was deemed a “continuation” of the predecessor, and thus liable for predecessor 
tortious conduct in allegedly producing a defective product.  See generally id. 
67.  See id.  Under New Jersey law, a “mere continuation” is established by the 
following factors: “continuity of ownership; continuity of management; continuity of 
personnel; continuity of physical location, assets and general business operations; and 
cessation of the prior business shortly after the new entity is formed,” and “the extent to which 
the successor intended to incorporate [the predecessor] into its system with as much the same 
structure and operation as possible,” thus determining “whether the purchaser holds itself out 
to the world as the effective continuation of the seller.”  See Bowen Eng’g v. Estate of Reeve, 
799 F. Supp. 467, 487–88 (D.N.J. 1992) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), aff’d, 19 F.3d 642 (3d Cir. 1994).  The court stressed this standard 
does not require that all factors are present—only some. See id. 
68.  See, e.g., Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 150 (3d Cir. 
2014) (describing “federal common law standard for successor liability that has slowly gained 
traction in the field of labor and employment disputes over the course of almost fifty years”). 
69.  See id. at 150–51 (noting federal standard “presents a lower bar to relief than most 
state jurisprudence,” in order to “impos[e] liability upon successors beyond the confines of the 
common law rule when necessary to protect important employment-related policies” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Einhorn v. M.L. Ruberton Constr. Co., 632 F.3d 89, 94 (3d 
Cir.2011))  (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
70.  See id. at 150–51 (quoting Brzozowski v. Corr. Physician Servs., Inc., 360 F.3d 
173, 178 (3d Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
71.  See Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 181–85 (1973) (applying 
federal common law standard to NLRA claims); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 
U.S. 543, 548–51 (1964) (applying federal common law standard to LMRA claims).  
72.  See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (finding “the denial by some employers of the right of 
employees to organize and the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of 
collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have 
the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce” and declaring it U.S. 
policy to eliminate these problems by “encouraging the practice and procedure of collective 
bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-
11
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the view of the Court, employees expect that NLRA violations, which disrupt 
their associational rights, will be remedied regardless of whether a predecessor 
or successor is in charge.73  Further, such remedies may usually be achieved “at 
minimal cost” to successor employers.74  The Court noted that employees and 
their unions typically are not involved in corporate negotiations to sell a 
business and therefore may be greatly “disadvantage[d].”75  After weighing 
companies’ interest in being able to restructure their businesses with 
employees’ interest in “some protection . . . from a sudden change in the 
employment relationship,” the Court decided to apply the federal standard to 
NLRA claims.76 
The Third Circuit later extended the federal standard to claims under Title 
VII and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), noting the 
policy agendas underlying those statutes are similarly broad and justify 
application of the standard.77  Finally, the Ninth and Seventh Circuits have 
extended the federal standard to the FLSA claims as the “logical extension of 
existing case law.”78 
 
organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of 
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection”); 
id. § 157 (providing “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or 
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining 
or other mutual aid or protection”); id. § 158(a)(5) (providing “[i]t shall be an unfair labor 
practice for an employer . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his 
employees”).  
73.  See Golden State Bottling Co., 414 U.S. at 184 (finding “[t]o the extent that the 
employees’ legitimate expectation is that the unfair labor practices will be remedied, a 
successor’s failure to do so may result in labor unrest as the employees engage in collective 
activity to force remedial action[,]” and noting successors may benefit from predecessors’ 
NLRA violations if employees identify labor policies of successor with those of predecessor 
and refrain from protected activities out of fear). 
74.  See Brzozowski, 360 F.3d at 177 (citing Golden State Bottling Co., 414 U.S. at 168) 
(discussing protection for employees’ associational rights and promotion of labor peace are 
important goals imposing only minimal costs on successors and noting costs associated with 
liability for NLRA violations can be taken into account during corporate purchase 
negotiations and may affect purchase price or be covered by indemnity clause).  
75.  See John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 376 U.S. at 549. 
76.  See id. 
77.  See Einhorn v. M.L. Ruberton Const. Co., 632 F.3d 89, 96 (3d Cir. 2011) (applying 
federal common law standard for successor liability to ERISA claims finding that policies 
underlying ERISA, protecting pension plan participants and their beneficiaries, “are no less 
important, and no less compel the imposition of successor liability than do the policies 
animating the NLRA, Title VII, or the other statutes to which the doctrine has been extended” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Brzozowski, 360 F.3d at 177–79 (applying federal 
common law standard for successor liability to employment discrimination claims under Title 
VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, noting similarities between Title VII and NLRA in that both 
emphasize protecting and “providing relief for the victims of prohibited practices . . . 
sufficient . . . to warrant imposing liability on a corporate successor for Title VII violations of 
the predecessor company” (quoting EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 
1086, 1091 (6th Cir. 1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
78.  See Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 151 (3d Cir. 2014).  
See generally Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, LLC, 711 F.3d 763, 765–67 (7th Cir. 
2013); Steinbach v. Hubbard, 51 F.3d 843, 845 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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3. Supervisors: When the Wage Thief is a Person 
Individuals are personally liable to workers for FLSA violations when they 
commit the violations while “acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an 
employer in relation to an employee.”79  In Haybarger v. Lawrence County 
Adult Probation & Parole80, the Third Circuit articulated a standard for 
individual liability under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), noting 
that statute’s close similarity to the FLSA.81  The court held “an individual is 
subject to FMLA liability when he or she exercises ‘supervisory authority over 
the complaining employee and was responsible in whole or part for the alleged 
violation’ while acting in the employer’s interest.”82  Sufficient “supervisory 
authority” exists under this standard when a supervisor “independently 
exercise[s] control over the work situation.”83 
III.  THOMPSON V. REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE NETWORK: THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
REAFFIRMS ENTERPRISE AND ADOPTS NEW TESTS ON SUCCESSOR AND 
SUPERVISOR LIABILITY 
In Thompson, the Third Circuit significantly expanded the FLSA’s reach to 
encompass more employment relationships.  The court considered a claim by 
Patricia Thompson, an employee of one “defunct” business and its successor.84  
Ms. Thompson sued for alleged overtime violations and sought to hold both 
entities liable and two co-owners personally liable as supervisors.85  Vacating 
the lower court’s dismissal of Thompson’s claims, the Third Circuit reaffirmed 
its test for joint employment established in Enterprise and adopted new tests 
with respect to successors’ and supervisors’ liability for FLSA violations.86 
 
79.  See 29 U.S.C. § 203(a), (d) (2012) (defining “person” as “an individual, 
partnership, association, corporation, business trust, legal representative, or any organized 
group of persons” and defining “employer” as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the 
interest of an employer in relation to an employee”). 
80.  667 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2012). 
81.  See id. at 417 (articulating standard for individual liability for FMLA violations).  
Under the FMLA, covered employees are entitled to unpaid, job-protected leave for twelve 
weeks after the birth of a child, to seek treatment for a serious health condition that renders 
them unable to work, or to care for a spouse, child, or parent with a serious health condition.  
See Wage and Hour Division, Family and Medical Leave Act, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/ [http://perma.cc/5LGH-A73G](last visited Nov. 25, 2015). 
82.  See Haybarger, 667 F.3d at 417 (quoting Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 694 
(7th Cir. 1987)) (discussing individual liability under FMLA).  The Haybarger court found a 
supervisor at a public agency may be liable for allegedly disciplining and discriminating 
against an employee for exercising protected FMLA rights.   See id. at 419. 
83.  See id. at 417 (alteration in original) (quoting Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co., 747 
F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
84.  See Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 145 (3d Cir. 2014). 
85.  See id. at 153–54 (detailing allegations against individual supervisors). 
86.  See generally id. (applying Enterprise factors to alleged joint employment 
relationship in Thompson, adopting the federal common law standard for successor liability, 
and adopting Haybarger standard for supervisor liability). 
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A. Accountability Through a Maze: Thompson’s Factual Background 
Security Atlantic Mortgage Company (SA), a “nationwide direct mortgage 
lender,” hired Patricia Thompson as a mortgage underwriter in June of 2009.87  
Soon after being hired, SA required Thompson to attend a training session led 
by an employee of Real Estate Mortgage Network (REMN).88  The REMN 
employee represented that SA and REMN were “sister compan[ies].”89 
In February 2010, Thompson’s superiors instructed her and other 
employees to “fill out new job applications to work for REMN.”90  Thompson 
complied and then REMN, not SA, began issuing her paychecks.91  SA went 
out of business, and the defendants characterized it as “defunct.”92  “Virtually 
no change” occurred in Thompson’s work environment despite her transfer to 
REMN.93  She and other employees continued to do “the same work, at the 
same desks, at the same location.”94  Her “pay rate, work email address, and 
direct supervisors” did not change.95  No employees were discharged, but some 
“continued to receive paychecks from [SA].”96 
Thompson alleged that between being hired by SA in June 2009 and 
leaving REMN on August 5, 2010, both employers permitted her “to regularly 
work more than eight hours per day and more than forty hours per week without 
overtime compensation” in violation of the FLSA.97  Thompson also sought to 
recover against Samuel Lamparello, SA’s co-owner and President, and Noel 
Chapman, its co-owner and Executive Vice President.98  According to 
Thompson, Lamparello and Chapman “made decisions concerning [both firms’] 
day-to-day operations, hiring, firing, promotions, personnel matters, work 
schedules, pay policies, and compensation,” including the authority to direct 
lower-level supervisors on personnel issues.99  In June 2010, Thompson asked 
Chapman about overtime, and he replied that he “did not pay overtime to 
underwriters.”100  The following month, Chapman emailed all employees 
thanking them for “long hours, late nights and even weekends” working for the 
 
87.  See id. at 145. 
88.  See id. 
89.  See id.  
90.  See id. 
91.  See id. 
92.  See id. 
93.  See id. 
94.  See id. at 146. 
95.  See id. 
96.  See id. 
97.  See id.  Thompson further alleged that her employers “uniformly misrepresented” 
to her and other employees “that they were exempt, salaried employees and, therefore, 
ineligible to receive overtime pay.”  See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
98.  See id. 
99.  See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (“When a work or personnel issue arose 
at [SA] or REMN that Thompson’s immediate supervisor could not address alone, the 
supervisor would consult with, among others, Chapman or Lamparello.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
100.  See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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company.101  “In 2011, both Chapman and Lamparello became officers of 
REMN.”102  On August 5, 2011, Thompson quit her job at REMN.103 
Thompson sued SA, REMN, Lamparello, and Chapman, seeking “to hold 
REMN liable for SA[’s] own statutory violations under theories of joint 
[employment] liability and successor liability.”104  Thompson further sought to 
hold Lamparello and Chapman “personally, jointly, and severally liable” as 
employers “by virtue of their [management] positions” within both firms.105  
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed 
Thompson’s complaint without prejudice.106  Thompson appealed the district 
court’s holding to the Third Circuit.107 
B. Widening the Net: Thompson Holdings on Joint Employers, 
Successors, and Supervisors 
The Third Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of Thompson’s 
claims.108  First, the Third Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of 
Thompson’s claim based on primary employer liability.109  The defendants 
argued that the lower court’s ruling should be sustained because Thompson 
“improperly group[ed] all defendants—individual and corporate—together and 
fail[ed] to differentiate between them . . . .’”110  The Third Circuit disagreed, 
finding it sufficient that “[t]he pleadings here put the corporate defendants on 
fair notice that the alleged violations began during Thompson’s employment” 
with SA and continued through her time at REMN.111 
Second, the court vacated the district court’s dismissal of Thompson’s joint 
employment claim.112  The court recited the factors of the Enterprise test and 
 
101.  See id.  
102.  See id. 
103.  See id. 
104.  See id. 
105.  See id. at 146–47 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
106.  See id. at 147.  The district court found Thompson failed to adequately plead a 
claim upon which relief could be granted.  See id.  According to the district court, Thompson 
simply alleged an employment relationship without alleging “specific facts connecting her 
employment to each named Defendant” as her employers.  See Thompson v. Real Estate 
Mortg. Network, No. 11–CV–01494 (DMC–JAD), 2011 WL 6935312, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 
2011) (“The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is an employee as defined by the FLSA and the 
NJWHL, and that each named Defendant is an employer and/or joint-employer within the 
meaning of the FLSA and the NJWHL.  Plaintiff does not, however, allege any specific facts 
connecting her employment to each named Defendant.  Without such specific facts, both the 
Court and Defendants are unable to determine the extent to which any of the named 
Defendants could be liable.”), vacated, 748 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 2014). 
107.  Thompson, 748 F.3d at 147 (noting Thompson “elect[ed] to stand on the 
dismissed complaint without further amendment” (citing Hogan v. Rodgers, 570 F.3d 146, 
151 (3d Cir. 2009))).  
108.  See id. at 154. 
109.  See id. at 148.  
110.  See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
111.  See id. 
112.  See id. at 149. 
15
D'Elia: Keeping FLSA's Promises: The Third Circuit Extends the Law's Reac
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
108 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW TOLLE LEGE [Vol. 60: p. 93 
 
applied Enterprise to the facts of Thompson.113  According to the Third Circuit, 
the district court’s finding that Thompson’s employment at each company was 
separate and distinct considered only “the name of the payor appearing on 
Thompson’s pay stubs,” which was inconsistent with FLSA’s broader 
conception of employment relationships.114  The court found Thompson’s 
required attendance at an REMN training indicated REMN had the “authority to 
promulgate work rules and assignments,” the second Enterprise factor, even 
before it officially hired Thompson.115  The REMN employee’s representation 
that REMN and SA were “sister compan[ies]” suggested to the court a “broader 
degree of corporate intermingling.”116  The court also found the “abrupt[] and 
seamless[]” nature of the alleged transfer of all SA employees to REMN 
suggested “shared authority over hiring”—the first Enterprise factor.117  
Finally, the court cautioned that its “assessment rest[ed] heavily on the [case’s] 
procedural posture,” and that a “fully developed factual record” may still 
indicate no joint employment existed.118  The court concluded Thompson 
alleged a joint employment relationship that could pass its Enterprise test with 
sufficient detail.119 
Third, the Third Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of 
Thompson’s claim against REMN as a successor to SA responsible for its 
FLSA liabilities.120  The defendants urged the court to apply the New Jersey 
state law standard for determining when a successor corporation is liable for its 
predecessor’s liabilities.121  As noted in Part II.B, the state law standard is 
significantly less inclusive than the federal common law standard for 
employment claims.122  Thompson urged the court to apply the federal 
standard, and the court agreed, finding it to be the “logical extension of existing 
case law.”123 
 
113.  See id. at 148–49 (“We have recently treated [joint employment issues] in some 
depth, and in so doing announced a directive that we described as the ‘Enterprise test.’” 
(citation omitted)). 
114.  See id. at 149. 
115.  See id. 
116.  See id. 
117.  See id. 
118.  See id. 
119.  See id. 
120.  See id. at 153. 
121.  See id. at 150 (noting defendants urged application of New Jersey law on 
successor corporations’ liability for predecessor debts and liabilities and reciting state law 
standard). 
122.  For a comparison of the state and federal standards on successor liability, see 
supra notes 66–78 and accompanying text. 
123.  See Thompson, 748 F.3d at 150–51.  The court quoted and adopted Judge Posner’s 
reasoning for applying the federal standard in the Seventh Circuit.  See id. at 152 (“We find 
[Judge Posner’s] pronouncement well reasoned, directly applicable, and in accord with our 
own jurisprudence.”).  According to Judge Posner, a more liberal successor standard is applied 
to employment claims because the various labor statutes have overarching policy objectives 
like “labor peace” (NLRA) or non-discrimination in employment (Title VII).  See Teed v. 
Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, LLC, 711 F.3d 763, 766 (7th Cir. 2013) (justifying broader 
standard for statutes with broad policy aims).  Judge Posner found these statutory goals are 
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After adopting the federal standard, the Third Circuit applied it to the facts 
of Thompson and found the allegations sufficient to demonstrate that REMN 
could be a successor liable for SA’s violations.124  The court found Thompson 
alleged plausible “continuity in operations and work force” because she 
“allege[d] that essentially all facets of the business at issue, including 
operations, staffing, office space, email addresses, employment conditions, and 
work in progress, remained the same after the February 2010 intercession of 
REMN.”125  With respect to the third factor, the predecessor’s ability to 
compensate victims, the court noted the defendants’ own characterization of SA 
as “defunct” and thus unable to pay any damages.126 
Fourth, the Third Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of 
Thompson’s claims against Lamparello and Chapman as supervisors.127  The 
court recited its Haybarger standard for personal claims against supervisors for 
FMLA violations.128  Applying that standard to Thompson’s FLSA claims, the 
court found her allegations contained sufficient information on the “scope of the 
[supervisors’] workplace authority . . . .”129  In particular, the court cited 
Chapman’s alleged statement “that he ‘did not pay overtime to underwriters’” 
and the fact that mid-level supervisors consulted with Lamparello and Chapman 
when they could not resolve a personnel issue alone.130 
IV.  KEEPING FLSA’S PROMISES: THOMPSON’S HOLDINGS COMPORT WITH THE 
TEXT AND POLICIES OF FLSA 
Thompson liberalized the tests for determining when an entity is an 
“employer” and liable for FLSA violations.131  These holdings are consonant 
 
served by a broader standard because “workers will often be unable to head off a corporate 
sale by their employer aimed at extinguishing the employer’s liability to them.”  See id.  Judge 
Posner found the FLSA’s goal of protecting workers’ standards of living is just “as fully 
deserving of protection” as the goals of other employment statutes.  See id.  Judge Posner also 
argued there is value in “legal predictability” in dealing with successors in the context of 
claims made under federal statutes designed to protect employees.  See id. at 767 (noting 
predictability weighs in favor of applying federal standard given “all the cases” that applied 
federal standard to employment claims). 
124.  See Thompson, 748 F.3d at 153 (“In total, then, these allegations are enough to 
surmount a motion to dismiss under the federal standard.”). 
125.  See id. at 152.  The court found it was “unclear” whether the federal standard’s 
second factor, notice to the successor, was met here.  See id. at 153.  However, the court found 
at this stage in the litigation, Thompson could not be expected to offer “detailed proof” of this 
notice given her relatively subordinate position within the company.  See id. 
126.  See id. at 153 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
127.  See id. at 154. 
128.  See id. at 153 (noting “[a]side from the corporate entity itself, a company’s 
owners, officers, or supervisory personnel may also constitute ‘joint employers’ for purposes 
of liability under the FLSA” and describing its recently articulated standard for such 
supervisor claims in context of FMLA). 
129.  See id. at 154. 
130.  See id. 
131.  For a discussion of Thompson’s holdings, see supra notes 84–130 and 
accompanying text. 
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with FLSA’s broad conception of employment, evidenced by its “employer” 
definition.132  Further, these holdings facilitate FLSA’s ambitious policy 
purposes.133 
A. Thompson Is Consistent with FLSA’s Broad Language 
Thompson’s broad tests to determine employer status under FLSA match 
the “expansive” statutory definition of employer and its emphasis on “economic 
reality” rather than technical concepts.134  Joint employers can exercise 
significant influence over workers’ terms and conditions of employment as a 
matter of “economic reality,” even when such influence is not exercised 
directly.135  For instance, if a contractor-employer requires its employees to 
attend a client-employer’s training and learn its rules, the client-employer is 
shaping the rules that govern workers’ conduct.136  If a client-employer 
demands discipline of workers and the contractor-employer complies, workers 
face punishment—though indirect—at the command of the client-employer.137  
If a client-employer caps the wages of a contractor-employer’s employees, the 
client-employer controls the most important employment term through its 
contract demands.138  All of these examples of indirect control suggest control 
over the work relationship in view of “economic reality.”139  As such, they 
 
132.  For an analysis of Thompson in the context of the FLSA’s statutory language, see 
infra notes 134–44 and accompanying text. 
133.  For a discussion of Thompson’s impact on FLSA’s policy purposes, see infra 
notes 145–78 and accompanying text. 
134.  See 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2012) (defining “employer”).  The FLSA “expansive[ly]” 
defines “employer” as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer 
in relation to an employee[,]” a definition of “striking breadth.”  See id.; Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (“While the FLSA, like ERISA, defines an 
‘employee’ to include ‘any individual employed by an employer,’ it defines the verb ‘employ’ 
expansively to mean ‘suffer or permit to work.’  This latter definition, whose striking breadth 
we have previously noted, stretches the meaning of ‘employee’ to cover some parties who 
might not qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency law principles.” 
(citations omitted)). 
135.  See Hickton v. Enter. Holdings, Inc. (In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour 
Emp’t Practices Litig.), 683 F.3d 462, 469 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Because of the uniqueness of the 
FLSA, a determination of joint employment ‘must be based on a consideration of the total 
employment situation and the economic realities of the work relationship.’  A simple 
application of the Lewis test would only find joint employment where an employer had direct 
control over the employee, but the FLSA designates those entities with sufficient indirect 
control as well.” (citation omitted)). 
136.  See, e.g., Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 
2014) (observing joint employment exists when “one employer controls, is controlled by, or is 
under common control with the other employer” (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(b)(3) (2015)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
137.  See, e.g., Floyd Epperson, 202 N.L.R.B. 23, 23 (1973) (finding joint employment 
in NLRA case where contractor-employer requested employee discipline carried out by client-
employer). 
138.  See, e.g., id. (noting that while client-employer set rates of pay, contractor 
employer indirectly influenced those rates by schedule and amount of payments to client-
employer). 
139.  See Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., 366 U.S. 28, 32–33 (1961) (declaring 
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ought to be taken into account and Thompson appropriately facilitates such 
consideration.140 
This “economic reality” interpretation resonates equally in the context of 
individual supervisors that act as FLSA employers.141  When a supervisor, 
pursuing the employer’s interest, violates the FLSA, they do so buttressed by 
the economic power of the employer.142  To the employee, the supervisor 
embodies the employer because the supervisor is authorized to act in the 
employer’s interest.143  Imposing liability on these actors for the violations they 
actually bring about comports with the “economic reality” interpretation of the 
FLSA’s definition, because, in a practical sense, they function as employers in 
relation to employees.144 
B. Thompson’s Tests Serve FLSA’s Broad Policy Agenda 
Congress enacted the FLSA not only to protect workers from abusive 
employment terms, but also to achieve the industrial policy goals of spreading 
employment and increasing consumers’ purchasing power.145  The Thompson 
tests focus on whether employment exists in economic reality, which is 
necessary to facilitate a policy calculated to affect nationwide economic 
 
“economic reality” to be “test of employment” under FLSA, and finding such employment in 
situation where, though “formal differences” may weigh against finding of employment, real 
world economic concerns like pay and disciplinary authority show employment under FLSA 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
140.  See generally Thompson, 748 F.3d 142.  This interpretation draws additional 
support from the Department of Labor’s FLSA regulations, which find employer status 
“[w]here the employers are not completely disassociated with respect to the employment of a 
particular employee and may be deemed to share control of the employee, directly or 
indirectly, by reason of the fact that one employer controls, is controlled by, or is under 
common control with the other employer.”  See 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(b)(3).  The Department’s 
emphasis on control is consistent with the “economic reality” standard for evaluating whether 
employer status exists: an employee of an employer that is controlled by a second employer 
surely may be said to be within the control of the second employer as a matter of economic 
reality.  See Goldberg, 366 U.S. at 32–33 (outlining “economic reality” standard).  
141.  See Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 417 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (finding FLSA test for employment turns on whether “supervisor carried out the 
functions of an employer with respect to the employee” (citing Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 
1509, 1510 (1st Cir. 1983))). 
142.  See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 
166–67 (1971) (finding statutory definition looks to the “facts involved in the economic 
relationship” (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
143.  See, e.g., Haybarger, 667 F.3d at 418–19 (finding supervisor exercised sufficient 
control to be deemed employer in analogous FMLA context when he evaluated employee’s 
performance, recommended her discharge to her employer, which the employer carried out, 
and finding “a jury could reasonably conclude that, but for the substantial authority wielded 
by [the supervisor], [the employer] would not have exercised his ultimate authority to fire [the 
employee]”). 
144.  See id. at 419 (finding rational jury could find supervisor was FMLA employer 
when he supervised an employee’s work, prepared her performance review, disciplined her, 
and retained the authority to fire her). 
145.  See supra note 39 and accompanying text.  
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conditions.146 
The joint employer context illustrates this point.147  If an immediate 
employer of workers is not free to act outside the constraints that a second-level 
employer imposes, the latter should have obligations under the FLSA if its 
policies are to be realized.148  The FLSA seeks to spread employment by 
making “overwork” costly.149  This policy is most workable if FLSA’s 
disincentive structure affects all entities that control worker employment.150  
Similarly, the minimum wage provisions of FLSA seek to increase workers’ 
purchasing power, but they are of little practical relevance if one or more 
entities that control the employment relationship may ignore noncompliance 
and shift blame to smaller entities with smaller economic footprints.151 
Broad “employer” standards are especially necessary given the recent 
growth in subcontracting and other multi-layered employment relationships.152  
 
146.  See Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(emphasizing “economic reality” as “the test of employment” and eschewing “technical 
concepts” (quoting Enterprise, 683 F.3d 462, 467–68 (3d Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); see also Linder, supra note 38, at 152 (“Although the minimum wage was 
obviously also designed to create micro-welfare effects, its primary function lay in removing 
labor costs from competition, increasing productivity macroeconomically by driving 
‘parasitic’ firms out of business and concentrating production in the most competent firms, 
and in steering capital-labor relations.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)). 
147.  See Thompson, 748 F.3d at 148–49 (explaining “economic reality” is impacted by 
the dynamics of control, finding control firms exert on each other in real world factor into 
employer analysis). 
148.  See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 726–27 (1947) (agreeing 
that Congress enacted FLSA to reduce distribution of goods produced under “subnormal labor 
conditions” or to correct “economic evils”); Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 
150–51 (1947) (noting FLSA’s conception of employment was “comprehensive enough to 
require its application to many persons and working relationships, which prior to [the FLSA], 
were not deemed to fall within an employer-employee category” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  The Court in Rutherford Food Corp. concluded this policy agenda justified a legal 
test of employment that hinged on “the circumstances of the whole activity.”  See id. at 730 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  One commentator credited Rutherford Food Corp. and 
other early FLSA cases with interpreting the law “broadly and to appeal to its underlying 
purposes.”  See Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY 
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 22 (2010).  Professor Rogers found Rutherford Food Corp. noteworthy 
in that it broadly “appealed to the statute’s purposes,” and emphasized that workers were “part 
of [an] integrated unit of production.”  See id. at 23. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
149.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
150.  For further discussion on the FLSA’s policy justifications, see supra notes 31–42 
and accompanying text. 
151.  See Rogers, supra note 148, at 23 (“One thus might interpret the Court as having 
based its [Rutherford] decision on grounds of policy: if the statute aimed to eradicate the 
‘economic evil’ of very low-wage work, it seemed to reason, and if the [second level, client-
employer] enjoyed the power to determine the workers’ wages, then it should be held liable as 
their employer.”).  
152.  See id. at 1 (“In recent decades, responding to the globalization of product and 
labor markets, major firms have extended their supply chains and subcontracted many tasks 
that do not require skilled labor.”).  Professor Rogers argued that while FLSA scholars mostly 
support addressing this issue by “liberalizing tests for joint employer liability,” courts would 
better effectuate FLSA by imposing a “duty of reasonable care to prevent wage and hour 
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In 2013, 3.4 million Americans worked for “staffing” businesses, accounting for 
2.5% of all employment in the United States.153  The American Staffing 
Association reports an even higher number, stating that one in ten workers are 
hired by a staffing business each year.154  From 2009 to 2013, employment in 
the staffing industry increased by 41%, while all other employment grew by just 
6%.155  The amount of temporary workers hired through agencies for short-
term employment more than doubled between 1990 and 2008, from 1.1 million 
to 2.3 million workers.156  Multi-layered employment is especially common in 
construction and custodial services where 51% and 37% of workers, 
respectively, are employed by contractors, rather than the clients receiving the 
services.157  Research suggests outsourcing is associated with lower wages and 
fewer benefits for employees.158  This renders the joint employment inquiry 
under the FLSA especially important as multi-layered employment relationships 
proliferate.159 
Congress enacted the FLSA to protect workers who occupied vastly 
unequal bargaining positions with respect to their employers.160  Workers in 
 
violations within their domestic supply chains.”  See id. at 2.  Thompson certainly represents 
the former approach.  See generally Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142 
(3d Cir. 2014). 
153.  See RUCKELSHAUS ET AL., supra note 21, at 19 (reporting number of U.S. jobs in 
staffing). 
154.  See Grabell, supra note 21 (quoting American Staffing Association claim that 
staffing jobs account for up to 10% of all U.S. employment). 
155.  See RUCKELSHAUS ET AL., supra note 21, at 21 (reporting 41% growth in staffing 
jobs between August 2009 and 2013). 
156.  See Tian Luo, Amar Mann & Richard Holden, The Expanding Role of Temporary 
Help Services from 1990 to 2008, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Aug. 2010, at 3, 3 (charting growth 
in temporary help jobs from 1990 to 2008 and finding sector experienced “explosive” growth 
between 1990 and 2000). 
157.  See Annette Bernhardt, Labor Standards and the Reorganization of Work: Gaps 
in Data and Research 17 (Inst. for Research on Labor & Emp’t, UC Berkeley Working Paper 
No. 100–14, Jan. 2014) (reporting percentages of workers employed by subcontractors in 
2012). 
158.  See Arindrajit Dube & Ethan Kaplan, Does Outsourcing Reduce Wages in the 
Low-Wage Service Occupations? Evidence from Janitors and Guards, 63 INDUS. & LAB. REL. 
REV. 287, 287 (2010) (finding outsourcing is generally associated with lower wages and 
fewer benefits for workers and specifically results in a 4% to 7% wage penalty for janitors and 
an 8% to 24% wage penalty for guards). 
159.  See Rogers, supra note 148, at 1 (basing evaluation of FLSA’s protection of 
workers on “economy no longer characterized by vertically integrated production”). 
160.  See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706–07 (1945) (“The legislative 
history of the Fair Labor Standards Act shows an intent on the part of Congress to protect 
certain groups of the population from substandard wages and excessive hours which 
endangered the national health and well-being and the free flow of goods in interstate 
commerce.  The statute was a recognition of the fact that due to the unequal bargaining power 
as between employer and employee, certain segments of the population required federal 
compulsory legislation to prevent private contracts on their part which endangered national 
health and efficiency and as a result the free movement of goods in interstate commerce.  To 
accomplish this purpose standards of minimum wages and maximum hours were provided.” 
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)); see also Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Muscoda Local 
No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944) (finding FLSA and its definition of “employ” are 
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subcontracted or other multi-layered employment relationships are likely to earn 
low wages and have very little bargaining power.161  Subjecting outsourcing 
employers to the FLSA’s protections serves the law’s goals by ensuring that 
even employees with an intermediary employer enjoy the law’s protections.162  
Employers may argue that this imposes unjust costs on outsourcers for 
violations they did not commit.163  However, the Enterprise test still requires 
active participation or influence of some kind on the part of the employer 
(including the ability to set rules, make hiring decisions, and the like).164  In 
this regard, Enterprise is arguably under-inclusive if “economic reality” is to be 
the guiding principle; Enterprise fails to encompass some employers that take 
no active role in the employment relationship, yet still hold sway over terms and 
conditions of employment in view of “economic reality.”165  For example, 
companies at the purchasing end of a supply chain (to which Enterprise likely 
would not apply) may be uniquely capable of demanding compliance of 
employers down the supply chain via contractual provisions and monitoring.166 
 
“remedial and humanitarian in purpose”); id. (“We are not here dealing with mere chattels or 
articles of trade but with the rights of those who toil, of those who sacrifice a full measure of 
their freedom and talents to the use and profit of others.  Those are the rights that Congress 
has specially legislated to protect.  Such a statute must not be interpreted or applied in a 
narrow, grudging manner.”), superseded by statute, Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 251–262, as stated in Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513 (2014).  
161.  See Dube & Kaplan, supra note 158, at 287. 
162.  See 81 CONG. REC. 4983–84 (1937) (statement of Pres. Roosevelt) (urging 
Congress, in address that inspired FLSA, to pass a law “insuring to all our able-bodied 
working men and women a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work” (emphasis added)). 
163.  See, e.g., John P. McAdams & Michael A. Shafir, Parent Company Liability 
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 25 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 16, 17 (2006) (arguing 
Department of Labor’s understanding of joint employment, which Enterprise court relied on, 
should be changed because it “is causing increased legal exposure for corporations with 
subsidiary operations, because parent entities are being named as FLSA defendants even 
though they have no relationship with the employee bringing suit,” and taking issue with 
Department’s consideration of control exerted over other employers, arguing “[t]he true test of 
liability for a parent corporation under joint employment law should be whether it exerts 
control over the complaining employee(s), not whether it controls the purportedly offending 
subsidiary.”). 
164.  See supra note 17 and accompanying text (delineating Third Circuit’s Enterprise 
test for joint employment under FLSA).   
165.  For further discussion on the bounds of the Enterprise test, see supra notes 52–65 
and accompanying text. 
166.  See Rogers, supra note 148, at 46–47 (arguing for even broader joint employer 
liability standard than tests akin to Enterprise/Thompson).  Professor Rogers’s proposed 
standard would impose a “duty of reasonable care” to prevent foreseeable FLSA breaches 
down a company’s supply chain, regardless of whether a “contractual relationship with the 
primary wrongdoer” exists.  See id. at 2.  Professor Rogers argues, “violations are arguably 
foreseeable whenever one enters into a contract for goods or services in an industry with a 
well-publicized history of violations . . . .  They are acutely foreseeable if a firm plays one 
contractor or supplier off against another to lower prices, is a frequent purchaser of such 
goods or services, enters into a contract that does not include sufficient funding for minimum 
wages to be paid, and/or could but does not take reasonable steps to deter or prevent such 
violations.  In other words, when a firm engages in such a course of action it is not a mere 
bystander, but rather is helping to create or heighten the risk—or even the near-certainty—of 
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The FLSA’s practical impact would be similarly diluted if employers could 
evade their responsibilities under the law by handing their business off to a new 
entity, even one with the same top personnel, with no responsibility to 
compensate wronged workers.167  Opponents of the federal standard Thompson 
adopted may argue its broad standard unduly burdens successor corporations by 
forcing them to pay the cost of the predecessor’s violations.168  However, as 
Judge Posner pointed out in Teed, this is a weak argument.169  Judge Posner 
explained, “The successor will have been compensated for bearing the liabilities 
by paying less for the assets it’s buying; it will have paid less because the net 
value of the assets will have been diminished by the associated liabilities.”170  
Judge Posner also appropriately pointed out there is an interest in uniformity, 
and if the goals of other statutes warrant a broader federal successor standard, 
so should the equally important purposes of the FLSA.171  Moreover, Judge 
Posner and Thompson’s concern that employers could “extinguish” workers’ 
FLSA rights by transferring a firm to a successor company resonates with the 
Supreme Court’s application of the federal standard to NLRA claims.172  
 
noncompliance.  It therefore seems fair to hold it liable for that harm.”  See id. at 46–47.  
Although the Enterprise test fails to erect such a scheme, its “catchall” factor may partially 
address Rogers’s concerns.  See Enterprise, 683 F.3d 462, 469–70  (3d Cir. 2012) (“[T]his list 
is not exhaustive, and cannot be blindly applied as the sole considerations necessary to 
determine joint employment.  If a court concludes that other indicia of significant control are 
present to suggest that a given employer was a joint employer of an employee, that 
determination may be persuasive, when incorporated with the individual factors we have set 
forth.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  It must be noted, however, as 
Professor Rogers stresses, that courts have often fallen short in the “implementation” of 
similar control language to the detriment of aggrieved workers.  See Rogers, supra note 148, 
at 1.  
167.  See Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, LLC, 711 F.3d 763, 766 (7th Cir. 
2013) (“In the absence of successor liability, a violator of the [FLSA] could escape liability, 
or at least make relief much more difficult to obtain, by selling its assets without an 
assumption of liabilities by the buyer (for such an assumption would reduce the purchase price 
by imposing a cost on the buyer) and then dissolving.”). 
168.  See, e.g., Reply Brief of Appellant at 16, Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power 
Solutions, LLC, 711 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-2440), 2012 WL 6127031, at *16 
(arguing against application of federal common law successor standard to FLSA claims, 
emphasizing that FLSA “focuses its impact on an existing employment relationship,” and 
arguing none of FLSA’s policy objectives are served by “requiring a bona fide successor to 
compensate a predecessor employer’s former workers for unpaid wages”). 
169.  See Teed, 711 F.3d at 766–67 (pointing out that liability for FLSA violations will 
affect predecessor firms’ purchase prices). 
170.  Id. 
171.  See id. at 767. 
172.  Compare Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 184 (1973) (finding 
that “[t]o the extent that the employees’ legitimate expectation is that the unfair labor practices 
will be remedied, a successor’s failure to do so may result in labor unrest as the employees 
engage in collective activity to force remedial action,” and noting successors may benefit from 
predecessors’ NLRA violations if employees identify labor policies of successor with those of 
predecessor and refrain from protected activities out of fear), with Teed, 711 F.3d at 766 
(“[W]orkers will often be unable to head off a corporate sale by their employer aimed at 
extinguishing the employer’s liability to them.”).  
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Workers are no more capable of avoiding a sale calculated to deny their FLSA 
rights than one “extinguish[ing]” their associational rights.173 
Additionally, the FMLA’s policy goal of ensuring workers job-protected 
leave in the event of a birth or medical condition is no more important than 
FLSA’s protections against abusive employment terms.174  FLSA’s protections 
are arguably even more impactful upon workers’ interests in that they 
constantly govern the most important term (payment) of the employment 
relationship, not how that relationship must adapt to specific eventualities.175  If 
broadening the employer standard to certain supervisors is necessary to 
effectuate the FMLA, it is just as essential to FLSA, where supervisors act as 
the face of the employer with respect to wage violations by, for example, 
refusing to pay overtime.176  Extending FLSA’s scheme of incentives and 
disincentives to supervisors to achieve compliance serves the law’s broad 
agenda.177  Accordingly, Thompson’s adoption of the Haybarger FMLA 
standard for supervisor liability comports with FLSA’s equally expansive policy 
agenda.178 
 
173.  See Teed, 711 F.3d at 766 (internal quotation marks omitted) (finding FLSA’s 
policy purposes were “as fully deserving of protection as the labor peace, anti-discrimination, 
and worker security policies underlying the NLRA, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, ERISA, and 
MPPAA.” (quoting Steinbach v. Hubbard, 51 F.3d 843, 745 (9th Cir. 1995)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
174.  See Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 153 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(finding Third Circuit’s holding in Haybarger applied in “analogous context” of FMLA 
claims).  Indeed, the Third Circuit in Haybarger observed “that Congress, in drafting the 
FMLA, chose to make the definition of ‘employer’ materially identical to that in the FLSA 
means that decisions interpreting the FLSA offer the best guidance for construing the term 
‘employer’ as it is used in the FMLA.”  See Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & 
Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 414 (3d Cir. 2012) (emphasis added) (quoting Modica v. Taylor, 465 
F.3d 174, 186 (5th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
175.  Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 206–207 (2012) (establishing minimum wage rates and 
overtime compensation requirements applicable to most employees), with id. § 2612(a)(1) 
(ensuring twelve work weeks of job-protected leave per year for covered employees because 
of child’s birth, employee’s serious health condition, or to care for close relative’s serious 
health condition, among other reasons). 
176.  See Haybarger, 667 F.3d at 417 (holding FMLA “permits individual liability 
against supervisors at public agencies” given FLSA’s express definition of “employer” 
including “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to 
an employee and includes a public agency,” and FMLA’s “materially identical” definition 
(quoting Modica, 465 F.3d at 186) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
177.  See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 727 (1947) (agreeing with 
lower court that FLSA seeks to “correct[] [] economic evils through remedies which were 
unknown at common law” and that “underlying economic realities” should establish 
employment, finding employment where employees’ work is “a part of the integrated unit of 
production,” if not technically part of established employment relationship (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
178.  For a discussion of the policy agendas and “materially identical” definition of 
“employer” in FLSA and FMLA, see supra notes 174–76 and accompanying text. 
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V.  ADVICE FOR PRACTITIONERS: HANDLING FLSA CLAIMS AFTER THOMPSON 
Thompson’s tests expand the universe of potential FLSA-employer 
defendants.179  Accordingly, attorneys for employee-plaintiffs will argue 
Thompson renders multiple entities liable for FLSA violations.180  Conversely, 
defense attorneys will argue that their clients’ connections to workers or 
violations are too tenuous to render them employers.181 
A. After Thompson, Employee–Side Attorneys Will Argue That Putative 
Employers Exercise Sufficient Control 
On the joint employer front, plaintiffs’ attorneys will want to stress the 
interconnectivity of immediate employers and indirect employers with respect 
to employment matters.182  Evidence like a putative joint employer’s 
recommendations to an immediate employer regarding hiring, promotion, 
discipline, discharge, and the like will be probative to establish sway over hiring 
and discipline authority, the first and third Enterprise factors.183  Evidence of 
control over the parameters of the work relationship, such as dictating workers’ 
schedules, tasks, and rules, helps establish the second Enterprise factor.184  Mr. 
Rangel’s working conditions, described in Part I, provide an illustrative 
example.185  In addition to the delineated factors, plaintiffs’ attorneys should 
stress any outside indicia of control showing employment in “economic reality,” 
for instance, if one employer’s “hands were tied” because it was controlled by 
another employer.186 
 
179.  For a discussion of Thompson’s holdings, see supra notes 84–130 and 
accompanying text. 
180.  For advice for employee-side attorneys, see infra notes 182–96 and accompanying 
text.  
181.  For advice for employer-side attorneys, see infra notes 197–206 and 
accompanying text. 
182.  See, e.g., Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 149 (3d Cir. 
2014) (stressing, in joint employment determination, “[t]he employee responsible for 
Thompson’s training allegedly described REMN as [SA]’s ‘sister company,’ a term which 
suggests some broader degree of corporate intermingling.” (emphasis added)).  
183.  See, e.g., id. (“[T]he scenario described by Thompson, in which she and virtually 
all other [SA] employees were abruptly and seamlessly integrated into REMN’s commercial 
mortgage business while some of those same employees continued to be paid by [SA], 
supports Thompson’s claim that the two companies shared authority over hiring and firing 
practices.”). 
184.  See, e.g., id. (“[A]n employee of REMN conducted Thompson’s training 
immediately after she was hired by [SA] in June 2009, indicating that REMN had at least 
some authority to ‘promulgate work rules and assignments’ even before REMN formally 
hired Thompson . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
185.  See supra notes 2–28 and accompanying text. 
186.  See, e.g., Thompson, 748 F.3d at 148 (relying on Department of Labor’s 
conception of joint employment, holding joint employment exists where multiple employers 
“exert significant control” over workers “by reason of the fact that one employer controls, is 
controlled by, or is under common control with the other employer” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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With respect to successors, plaintiffs’ attorneys will want to demonstrate 
that, though a transition occurred, workers’ conditions remained the same.187  
Crucially, “continuity in operations” is considered as well as notice of FLSA 
violations and the predecessor’s ability to pay.188  Thompson’s facts provide a 
useful example: although the plaintiff’s paychecks were signed by a different 
payor, none of the workplace operations changed.189  Workers did the same 
work at the same stations.190  Furthermore, the predecessor was “defunct” and 
therefore unable to pay.191  Attorneys should mine the facts of their cases to 
draw parallels to this sort of scenario.192 
Finally, employee-side attorneys will want to establish that when 
supervisors were directly involved in conduct running afoul of FLSA, they were 
responsible for the statutory violation.193  Further, to be liable, the supervisors 
must have acted within the employer’s interest when the FLSA violation 
occurred.194  Here, Haybarger’s facts are instructive: a supervisor expressly 
recommended an allegedly unlawful discharge as “in the best interest of the 
[employer’s] overall operations.”195  Evidence establishing a FLSA violation 
under similar circumstances will go a long way towards holding supervisors 
responsible as employers for wage and hour violations.196 
B. Employer-Side Attorneys Will Argue That Their Corporate and 
Individual Clients Lack Sufficient Control over Workers 
On joint employment, employer-side attorneys will seek to minimize the 
 
187.  See id. at 151 (considering “continuity in operations and work force of the 
successor and predecessor employers” to determine liability, abandoning state law factor of 
express or implied adoption of liabilities by successor). 
188.  See id. (considering continuity in addition to “notice to the successor-employer of 
its predecessor’s legal obligation” and “ability of the predecessor to provide adequate relief 
directly” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
189.  See id. at 145–46 (“Despite Thompson’s transfer to REMN, virtually no change 
occurred in on-site operations.  Thompson and her colleagues continued to do the same work, 
at the same desks, at the same location.  Thompson’s pay rate, work email address, and direct 
supervisors remained the same.  Thompson alleges that no employees were laid off during this 
transition, although some of her colleagues continued to receive paychecks from [SA].”). 
190.  See id. 
191.  See id. at 153 (“[D]efendants have represented that [SA] is now ‘defunct,’ which 
we take to mean that it is likely incapable of satisfying any award of damages to Thompson.”). 
192.  See id. 
193.  See Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 417 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (crafting test for supervisor liability under FMLA, which Thompson court applied 
to FLSA: “an individual is subject to FMLA liability when he or she exercises ‘supervisory 
authority over the complaining employee and was responsible in whole or part for the alleged 
violation’ while acting in the employer’s interest” (citing Riodran v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 
690, 694 (7th Cir. 1987))). 
194.  See id. 
195.  See Haybarger, 667 F.3d at 418 (emphasis added). 
196.  See Thompson, 748 F.3d at 154 (noting supervisor’s alleged statement and 
authority to address personnel issues that mid-level supervisors could not established 
sufficient control to be deemed FLSA employer). 
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“degree of corporate intermingling” between putative joint employers and 
immediate employers.197  These attorneys will argue that all control over the 
terms and conditions of workers’ employment rests with the immediate 
employer.198  They will argue, whenever possible, that defendants have no 
control—or even knowledge—over personnel decisions and that the defendants 
do not involve themselves in employee discipline.199  While some control of 
the rules and schedules governing workers may be unavoidable, putative joint 
employers seeking to avoid that designation will argue that they simply set 
broad and general parameters that the immediate employer was free to meet any 
way it chose, and assigned workers only according to its own policies.200 
Successor defendants will stress that a complete break occurred when the 
firm changed hands.201  Any evidence that supports the absence of continuity 
will be useful to show the new business is not a continuation, but simply a firm 
that had the misfortune of purchasing all or parts of a business without knowing 
about any FLSA violations.202  These defendants will also argue that, although 
the predecessor no longer controls the business, it is still capable of 
compensating workers for its own wrongs, in which the successor was 
uninvolved.203 
Supervisors’ attorneys will seek to minimize the supervisor’s role in 
precipitating FLSA violations.204  While a violation may have occurred, these 
 
197.  See id. at 149. 
198.  See, e.g., Enterprise, 683 F.3d 462, 471 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding plaintiff failed to 
show joint employment to pass its newly enunciated joint employment test because putative 
joint employer “exercised no control, let alone significant control, over the [employees]”). 
199.  See id. 
200.  See id. (finding putative joint employer had “no authority to promulgate work 
rules or assignments, and no authority to set . . . schedules,”  and while plaintiffs argued 
putative joint employer’s “guidelines and manuals” to subsidiaries made it hold these roles 
“functionally,” the court found this unpersuasive, noting putative joint employer’s “suggested 
policies and practices [were] entirely discretionary on the part of the subsidiaries,” and that 
putative joint employer held “no more authority over the conditions of the assistant managers’ 
employment than would a third-party consultant who made suggestions for improvements to 
the subsidiaries’ business practices”). 
201.  See, e.g., Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, 711 F.3d 763, 768 (7th Cir. 
2013) (“[I]f [a firm’s] assets had been sold piecemeal there is no successor liability, because 
of the lack of continuity between predecessor and successor; for when a company is broken up 
and its assets sold piecemeal, there is no successor to transfer the company’s liability to.  But 
to allow [a firm] to acquire assets without their associated liabilities, thus stiffing workers who 
have valid claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, is equally a ‘windfall.’” (emphasis 
added)). 
202.  See id. (stressing “lack of continuity” between predecessors and successors when 
deciding whether to impose liability and finding where continuity is present, it would be 
inequitable to allow workers to go uncompensated for FLSA violations). 
203.  See id. at 766 (considering “[w]hether the predecessor could have provided relief 
after the sale,” as factor weighing in favor of workers’ interests because it considers likelihood 
they will be made whole in reality). 
204.  See Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 153 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(requiring supervisors be “responsible in whole or part for the alleged violation” in order to 
impose liability (emphasis added) (quoting Riodran v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 
1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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attorneys will want to show the supervisor was not actually the driving force 
behind the violation, and that some other player in the work relationship is 
responsible instead.205  Companies seeking to deflect responsibility for 
supervisors’ conduct will argue the supervisor was acting to serve an 
unsanctioned, personal interest that was unrelated to the employer’s 
interests.206 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Thompson expanded the reach of the FLSA in the Third Circuit to 
encompass “joint employers” with indirect control over workers, more 
successors under a relaxed standard, and individual supervisors so long as they 
are directly responsible for the violations themselves.207  This development 
comports with FLSA’s expansive language and policy agenda, which were 
intended to apply to a wide array of employment relationships to raise labor 
standards and reduce unemployment.208  This decision is especially relevant in 
today’s economy, where a growing percentage of work relationships are 
structured with multiple levels of businesses controlling workers’ terms and 
conditions of employment.209  However, the true test of Thompson’s progress 
will be whether courts adhere to its liberalized standards or instead look for 
escape routes in the facts of future cases.210 
 
 
205.  See id. 
206.  See id. (requiring supervisors to have committed FLSA violations “while acting in 
the employer’s interest” in order to impose liability (emphasis added)). 
207.  For a discussion of Thompson’s confirmation of Enterprise and additional tests on 
successor and supervisor liability, all of which will liberalize the test for employment, see 
supra notes 84–130 and accompanying text. 
208.  For a discussion of FLSA’s underlying policies, see supra notes 31–42 and 
accompanying text. 
209.  For a discussion of the increasing prevalence of multi-layered employment 
relationships, see supra notes 152–59 and accompanying text. 
210.  See Rogers, supra note 148, at 1 (noting FLSA scholars have mostly endorsed 
liberalized tests like Thompson, while noting courts have often fallen short on 
“implementation”). 
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